‘Syria has been at the heart of human civilisation for
thousands of years. The violence now raging across the country often seems
random and inexplicable but it isn’t. If you want to understand what’s
happening in Syria and this region at the moment there’s only one place to
start, and that’s in the past. Those fighting for control of Syria nurse
grievances stretching back centuries.’
I watched Dan Snow’s documentary ‘A History of Syria’ (BBC
Two, 11 March), in which he tried to explain the historic roots of the on-going
conflict there. Snow had clearly delved deep into Syrian history and tried to
understand the dynamics of what’s happening today, travelling to various parts
of Syria and talking to both pro and anti-regime Syrians. Unfortunately, his conclusions
were distorted by his overreliance on historic precedents and the extent to
which past grievances are dictating what’s happening today.
The documentary is still worth watching, (watch it here), but it’s a missed opportunity to examine the historic
aspects of the Syrian conflict without falling into the trap of deterministic
sectarian narratives. Snow’s argument, in a nutshell, is that the historic grievances
between Alawites and Sunnis are directly responsible for the conflict raging in
Syria today.
Snow cites the historic persecution of Alawites at the hand
of Sunni rulers and finds parallels with the anti-Alawite rhetoric and the
accusations of heresy levelled against them by some Sunni clerics. (He
interviews one such cleric in Tripoli, Lebanon.) In parallel, he identifies the
bloody suppression of the 1982 revolt in Hama by Assad Sr. as a cause for the Sunni
desire for revenge which he argues influenced the path of the Syrian uprising.
No one can deny the sectarian aspect of the Syrian civil
war, but like many before him Snow is wrong in attributing cause and effect. Framing
the conflict in terms of long-standing sectarian animosities makes it sound
like another inevitable episode in a history of violence and revenge. That is a
common form of fatalistic determinism among many Middle East observers and
analysts. In reality, the sectarian tone, while never entirely absent, became
more apparent in response to the violent suppression of the uprising and the
subsequent militarisation of the opposition.
This wasn’t inevitable. Sectarian mobilisation and alarmism
about existential threats surfaced in the absence of cross-sectarian political
narratives and the regime’s response to peaceful demonstrations. But the
paralysis of social and political life in Syria for decades was bound to impact
on the ability to form such narratives and the ability of new national leaders
to emerge and play a role in the uprising. But it’s by no means a rehearsal of
an ancient history repeating itself, that is simplistic.
Snow, on the other hand, was right to identify how the
Syrian conflict was aggravated by external meddling:
But there’s also another echo from Syria’s long history
that’s prolonging the current conflict. Syria is once again at the centre of a
struggle involving global and regional powers for control over its future. Russia and Shiite Iran support Assad’s regime
while Sunni Arab states and the west increasingly back elements of the
opposition.
The great forces of Syrian history are fuelling a bitter
war. East versus west, Sunni versus Alawite, secularism versus religion,
democracy versus authoritarianism. The threads running through this conflict
mean that there’s no simple solution. All Syrians are now asking what the
future holds for their country.
But he over-dramatized the nature of that meddling in presenting
it as a replay of past global struggles over Syria. External actors have
inflamed the situation, but driven less by those ‘timeless’ struggles than
immediate concerns that remain largely ambiguous and confused. Two years on for
example and the US is no nearer to formulating a clear policy on Syria. Yet,
hapless meddling from all sides has tragic consequences.
At the end, Snow tried to find a ray of hope in Syria’s
tradition of tolerance:
But for now there’s no current end in sight for the
current violence which has left a military stalemate on the ground. Ultimately
Syria’s different communities are going to have to talk and work out a way of
living alongside each other again to prevent the country’s total destruction.
But Syria’s long history shows that this, at least, is possible.
But that is also a dangerous conclusion, although one that
is gaining currency fast. In seeing the conflict between Syrians as one between
communities, the solution is increasingly being seen in terms of a communitarian
peace deal. (Akin to what happened in Lebanon). That means the political nature
of the conflict will be subsumed by a deal that will enshrine communitarianism
within Syria’s future.
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Seems like the communitarian, 'confessional' solution mentioned at the end would be a good one. A republic, with also percentage ranges by sect, including 'other'. Lessening the government's direct ownership and involvement in the economy would also be good. Greatly lessening income inequality/unevenness of opportunity. At least, these are things that I would hope for for their country.
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